Se o Estado não é uma empresa, porque se fala de insolvência?

Em fim-de-semana, paremos para pensar um pouco sobre a razão de ser e os limites da analogia entre Estado e empresas a propósito da ideia de insolvência:

 Creditor countries calling the tune by which debtor countries dance is not a new invention. But using the language of insolvency to do so is new. So when and why did it happen? The single European currency project, in depriving member states of the ability to issue their own currency, has created the conditions for something close to national insolvency when economies slump. With high debt-to-national output ratios, current account deficits, fiscal deficits, and, putting it mildly, shaky banking systems, the debtor countries of Europe look very much like insolvent firms to the markets. Their sovereign power to issue currency is gone, meaning only painful deflation through the wage channels are possible. Leaving the currency union is very, very costly. The solution is national austerity. Indeed, in some cases, like Cyprus, Ireland, and Italy, the banking systems are so big relative to the rest of the economy as to make the sovereign itself almost vestigial.
(Stephen Kinsella, no Blogue da Harvard Business Review)

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